We show that the non-cooperative equilibrium in a two-period duopoly with consumer variety-seeking may be the same as the collusive outcome in an otherwise identical market without variety-seeking. Specifically, our variety-seeking model implies tacit collusion between firms in both periods, and not just in the second period only as in the switching-cost model of Klemperer (1987a Klemperer ( , 1987b , which applies to markets with consumer inertia. Interestingly, when consumers are assumed to have rational expectations about future prices, the collusion result in the first period becomes even stronger.
Introduction
Variety-seeking is a pervasive phenomenon in many markets. For example, consumers go to different restaurants from one dining occasion to the next. Consumers go to different vacation spots from one holiday to the next, and to different tourist attractions from one day to the next within a holiday spell. Consumers buy different brands of cereals on different purchasing trips at the grocery store for the same reason. These markets are said to be characterized by consumer variety-seeking on account of the costs incurred by consumers (such as due to satiation with attributes consumed in the past, see McAlister 1982) from consuming the same product on consecutive purchase occasions. More recently, using a laboratory experiment, Ratner, Kahn and Kahneman (1999) show that consumers alternate between more preferred and less preferred options in a search for variety. The actual extent of such variety-seeking in a local market can be influenced by firms, for example, by their product design choices. For example, a family that eats out every Saturday may try a different ethnic menu each week (e.g. Italian, Chinese, Indian etc.). However, even if the different restaurants offer functionally identical products (e.g., suppose all restaurants in the neighborhood had identical menus and quality levels), the family may still switch between the restaurants from week to week purely on account of obtaining some subjective satisfaction from "trying something different". In other words, variety-seeking can arise simply out of the consumer's boredom from staying with the same product from one period to the next. For example, an experimental study in social psychology by Brickman and D'Amato (1975) explains subjects' variety-seeking among alternatives using the notion of consumer boredom that sets in after exposure to a given stimulus. Zuckerman (1979) developed a sensation seeking scale (SSS) which includes a stable and reliable consumer factor called boredom susceptibility (BS), which measures consumer aversion for repetitive experience of any kind, which has been used by consumer behaviorists to explain consumer variety-seeking among familiar alternatives (see, for example, Raju 1980) . Givon (1984) , in an empirical analysis of consumer variety-seeking among brands, argues that change is rewarding in and of itself to the consumer, regardless of the object from which or to which one changes. Defined in this manner, variety-seeking can be said to capture staying costs for the consumer, as opposed to inertia capturing switching costs, as in Klemperer (1987a) .
In this paper we examine the implications of consumer variety seeking for the competitiveness of markets. We define variety-seeking in two ways: one, in terms of a staying cost that the consumers incur from consuming the same product on successive purchase occasions; two, in terms of changing consumer preferences for underlying product attributes.
1 . Using a two-period duopoly framework, we find that variety-seeking makes each individual firm's demand more inelastic in both periods, and so reduces rivalry between firms. The intuition for this finding is as follows: In the first period, the market segments into two sub-markets. Each sub-market contains consumers who have bought from a particular firm and these consumers are, in effect, ripe targets for the competing firm in the second period, on account of varietyseeking effects. The existence of this "installed base" (i.e., customers of the competing firm from the previous period) for each firm makes each firm charge higher prices in the second period than in the absence of variety-seeking effects. In the first period, firms anticipate this second-period effect, i.e., that their first-period market shares will benefit the other firm in the second period. This reduces their incentive to keep the first-period prices low, which ends up sustaining higher prices for both firms than in the absence of variety-seeking effects. Therefore, the resulting non-cooperative sub-game perfect equilibrium for firms' prices in the two periods ends up looking similar to the collusive equilibrium in an otherwise identical market with no variety-seeking. Interestingly, while our second-period analysis is not unlike the second-period analysis in Klemperer (1987a) , our first-period analysis is dramatically different. In fact, the switching-cost model of Klemperer (1987a) would predict fierce price-competition in the first period which may even undo, from a profitability standpoint, the benefits of tacit collusion in the second period. In our model, however, firms' prices and profits increase in both periods.
Our model provides one explanation 2 , for example, for why theme parks owned by com-peting firms within a given tourist city, such as Orlando, do not compete fiercely on prices, especially during the holiday season, in order to draw greater traffic to their parks. The rationale for such "mutual forebearance" could be the companies' recognition that the swarm of tourists who are going to spend an extended holiday at Orlando, spanning possibly a week or more, will seek variety in their entertainment options from one day to the next. 
Background Literature on Consumer Variety-Seeking
Variety-seeking refers to consumers' inter-temporal switching between different consumption substitutes in the absence of any change in characteristics pertaining to the consumption substitutes. Such variety-seeking behavior by consumers has been empirically documented across a wide range of consumption contexts in the consumer behavior literature (for a review of the variety-seeking literature, see Kahn 1995) .
One explanation for such variety-seeking behavior, proposed by Jeuland (1978) , is that prior experience with a brand decreases the consumer's utility for the brand 3 . This explanation has governed the subsequent development of a number of statistical models of variety-seeking (see Givon 1984 , Kahn, Kalwani and Morrison 1986 , Bawa 1990 , Trivedi, Bass and Rao 1994 , Roy, Chintagunta and Haldar 1996 , Seetharaman, Ainslie and Chintagunta 1999 , Seetharaman 2004 ). An alternative explanation of variety-seeking behavior, provided by McAlister (1982) , is that consumers become satiated after exposure to some attributes and seek alternatives that offer some other attributes. 4 This explanation, unlike that of Jeuland (1978) , is predictive of not only the consumer's tendency to switch away from the most recently consumed brand, but also the brand that the consumer will switch to. This explanation has governed the subsequent development of a number of statistical models of variety-seeking (see Lattin and McAlister 1985 , Lattin 1987 , Feinberg, Kahn and McAlister 1992 , Erdem 1996 , Seetharaman, Feinberg and Chintagunta 2001 , Che, Sudhir and Seetharaman 2006 . Given the widespread use of empirical models that are based on these two explanations, we use these two alternative explanations to assist our operationalization of the variety-seeking construct in the theoretical models that we develop in the ensuing sections.
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Taking the view of Jeuland (1978) , variety-seeking is operationalized as a staying cost incurred by a consumer from repeat-purchasing a previously consumed brand. Taking the view of McAlister (1982) , variety-seeking is operationalized as changing consumer preferences for attributes consumed in the past. In section 3, we use the staying cost operationalization only since we deal with a market for functionally undifferentiated products. In the differentiated products case, analyzed in section 4, we simultaneously allow for both operationalizations, i.e., staying cost and changing consumer preferences, of variety-seeking. We find that the pricing implications obtained with the staying cost operationalization of section 3 are consistent with the pricing implications obtained with the changing preferences operationalization of section 4
(for a study on the implications of variety-seeking on front-loaded versus rear-loaded promo- Raju (1980) etc. 4 This explanation is consistent with single-peaked preference functions that have been uncovered in physiological psychology experiments, see Coombs and Avrunin 1977. 5 There are other explanations for observed variety-seeking behavior of consumers, as detailed in the taxonomies developed by McAlister and Pessemier (1982) and Kahn (1995) . We focus on these two explanations from the modeling standpoint for the sake of parsimony. Furthermore, these two explanations have been shown to have good empirical validity in several categories of consumer packaged goods.
tions, see Zhang, Krishna and Dhar 2000) . 6 It is useful to note that our model does not apply to markets where consumers seek variety within purchase occasions by buying portfolios of products from different firms at the same time (as in Farquhar and Rao 1976 , McAlister 1979 , Walsh 1995 , Kim, Allenby and Rossi 2002 . Our model only applies to the discrete choice situation where consumers buy one unit of product at a purchase occasion, but seek variety across purchase occasions by buying products from different firms over time. Such markets are widespread in nature and have largely been the focus of the variety-seeking literature discussed above.
Duopoly Pricing Model -Functionally Undifferentiated Products
Consider two firms -A and B -producing functionally undifferentiated products in a market with M consumers. We consider these M consumers' choices, as well as the two firms' pricing decisions, within a two period framework. In the first period consumers have no choice history with either firm, i.e., consumers have not bought either product in the past. However, secondperiod "staying costs"(on account of consumers' variety-seeking tendencies) are created for consumers on account of their first period choices. Consumer i's utility function in period t is assumed to be as follows.
where U ijt stands for consumer i's (i = 1, ..., M ) utility for product j (j = A, B) in period t (t = 1, 2), U i0t stands for consumer i's reservation utility for the product category (i.e., utility obtained by the consumer from buying the outside good), p jt stands for the price of product j in period t, I ijt−1 is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if consumer i bought product j in 6 The modeling frameworks in Sections 3 and 4 resemble those in Klemperer (1987a) and Klemperer (1987b) very closely. period t − 1, and 0 otherwise, s i is a parameter that captures consumer i's staying cost of repeatpurchasing the product that they had bought in the previous period 7 , and r 0i is a parameter that represents consumer i's reservation price in the product category. The consumer's choice problem is to choose the alternative that maximizes his utility function. In other words,
represent the first-order conditions of the consumer's product choice problem. We assume consumers to be heterogeneous in terms of both their staying costs, s i , as well as their reservation prices, r 0i . Specifically, we assume that Γ(s) stands for the % of customers whose staying costs are ≤ s (with Γ(0) = 0), and γ(s) =
∂Γ(s) ∂s
≥ 0 stands for the corresponding density function of the staying costs. We assume that h(r) stands for the fraction of consumers whose reservation prices are greater than or equal to r.
The two firms' single-period profit functions are assumed to be as follows.
where π At (π Bt ) stands for firm A's (B's) profits in period t, c At (c Bt ) stands for firm A's (B's) total cost in period t, and q At (q Bt ) stands for firm A's (B's) demand in period t.
Under the above-mentioned primitives of utility maximization of consumers and profit maximization by firms, we will first analyze firms' pricing decisions in the second period, and locate a symmetric equilibrium in a general model where variety-seeking tendencies are heterogeneously distributed across consumers. Then, we will analyze firms' pricing decisions in the first period, explicitly taking into account the dependence of firms' second-period profits on their first period sales. 7 The staying cost operationalization, consistent with the variety-seeking definition of Jeuland (1978) , captures the idea that a consumer's utility decreases from repeat-purchasing the previously consumed brand. For a recent application of this operationalization of variety-seeking, see Seetharaman, Ainslie and Chintagunta (1999) .
Let σ A1 and σ B1 (= 1 − σ A1 ) represent the firms' respective shares of the first period's sales. WLOG, let p A2 ≤ p B2 . Under the consumer utility primitives laid out earlier, the equilibrium sales for the two brands in period 2 can be shown to be
where firm B sells only to A's customers with staying costs ≥ (p B2 − p A2 ) and reservation prices ≥ p B2 . Firm A, on the other hand, sells to all B's customers with reservation prices ≥ p A2 (the first term of equation (9)), to its own customers with reservation prices ≥ p B2 and staying costs ≤ (p B2 − p A2 ) (the second term of equation (9)), and also to its own customers with reservation prices in the range (p A2 , p B2 ) and staying costs ≤ (r − p A2 ) (the third term of equation (9)).
Taking the second period profit functions of firms as those yielded by plugging t = 2 in equations (7) and (8), and making the assumption of Bertrand price competition, firm A's firstorder condition is as follows.
Substituting from equation (9) in equation (11) yields
where
, which implies that
If γ(0) = 0 (which represents a market where all consumers seek variety), then equation (13) can be rewritten as
where q = 2q A2 = h(p) and we have assumed that c A (.) = c B (.). Equation (14) is just the firstorder condition for a monopolist (or collusive oligopoly) in a market without variety-seeking.
As γ(0) → ∞ (which represents a market where no consumer seeks variety), then equation (13) can be rewritten as
Equation (15) shows that the market price approaches the competitive price (i.e., firms' marginal cost) as we approach the case of no variety-seeking.
With γ(0) between these extreme cases, the equilibrium is between the competitive and collusive equilibrium given above. Therefore, in a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, the only information about the distribution of variety-seeking in the market that matters is the density of consumers who do not seek variety, γ(0). These are the marginal consumers who are sensitive to a small deviation in one firm's price from its competitor's price. 
Period One
Firm A chooses its first-period price p A1 to maximize its total discounted future profits,
taking B's first-period price p B1 as given. Under Bertrand pricing equilibrium, firm A's firstorder condition is given by
which can be rewritten as
In the above equation, since
> 0 and the second-period analysis shows that
< 0. Since a lower market share makes the firm better off in the second period, firms A and B choose their first-period price higher than that which maximizes first-period profits given the opponent's behavior. In other words, in the presence of consumer variety-seeking, firms price higher than Nash-Bertrand in the first period, in order to lose market share that will be valuable to them in the second period. On average, firms end up with no less market share as a result of this behavior. Since they price higher, their first-period profits increase (to collusive levels)! This shows that the existence of consumer variety-seeking leads to monopoly rents not only in a mature market but also in the early stages of the market's development. Next, we derive the implications of variety-seeking in a differentiated products market.
Duopoly Pricing Model -Functionally Differentiated Products
Consider two firms -A and B -producing functionally differentiated (i.e., differentiated by attributes) products -represented as end points of a Hotelling line of length L -in a market with M consumers. We consider these M consumers' choices, as well as the two firms' pricing decisions, within a two period framework. Consumer i's utility function in period t is assumed to be as follows.
where x it stands for the distance of consumer i's (i = 1, ..., M ) (possibly time-varying) ideal point in period t (t = 1, 2) from the position of product A on the Hotelling line (which makes L − x it the distance of consumer i's ideal point in period t from the position of product B), and the remaining variables are as explained under equations (1)- (3). The consumer's choice problem is one of choosing the alternative that maximizes his utility function, as in equations (4)-(6). We assume that there are three discrete consumer types among the M consumers in the market, where each type's ideal points, x it , are uniformly distributed on the Hotelling line of length L: (1) A fraction ν that enters the product market during a given period and leaves the market at the end of the period, (2) a fraction µ that stays in the market during both periods, but whose tastes for product attributes in the second period are independent of their tastes in the first period, i.e., their second period location, x i2 , is independent of their first period location, x i1 , and (3) a fraction (1 − ν − µ) that stays in the market during both periods, but has perfectly changing tastes for the underlying product characteristics in the sense that a consumer located at x i1 in the first period is located at (L − x i1 ) in the second period. In other words, this fraction's second-period tastes are "mirror images"of their first-period tastes. 9 Which of the above three types a consumer belongs to is assumed to be independent of the consumer's position along (0, L) in the first period, unaffected by the consumer's first-period decision, and unknown to the consumer until after the consumer's first-period purchase. Further, we assume that all consumers have the same reservation price and staying cost, i.e., r i = r ∀ i = 1, ..., M and s i = s ∀ i = 1, ..., M .
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The two firms' single-period profit functions are assumed to be as in equations (7)- (8),
with the additional assumptions that there are no fixed costs and that both firms have the same marginal cost c. In other words, c At = cq At and c Bt = cq Bt . Both firms and consumers are assumed to have rational expectations and discount second-period revenues and costs by a factor λ in first-period terms. They cannot store the product between periods. In first-period equilibrium all consumers to the left of σ A1 L buy from A, while all those to the right buy from B, so that the outcome of the first period is fully captured by the firms' market shares.
Period Two
The equilibrium sales for the two brands in the second period can be derived by adding up the equilibrium sales from the three consumer types, as shown below. 11 1. Among the fraction ν of second period consumers, who were not in the market in the first period, a consumer at x i2 buys from A if p A2 + x i2 < p B2 + (L − x i2 ) and p A2 + x i2 ≤ r. Thus A sells to a mass ν
of the new consumers, provided that
, which condition ensures that the marginal consumer prefers buying from A to not buying at all, and provided that
sells to all of the new consumers; if (p B2 − p A2 ) < −L, A sells to none of them.
2. Among the fraction µ of second period consumers whose tastes have changed from the first period, a sub-fraction µσ A1 have bought from A in the first period and a sub-fraction µσ B1 have bought from B in the first period. Both of these sub-fractions have consumers whose second-period tastes are uniformly distributed along the line segment (0, L). Let us consider the first sub-fraction. Among these µσ A1 consumers, A sells to a mass
so that the marginal consumer buys from some firm and provided
all of this sub-fraction of consumers; if (p B2 − p A2 − s) < −L, A sells to none of them. Now let us consider the second sub-fraction. Among these µσ B1 consumers, A sells to a mass µσ B1
to all of this sub-fraction of consumers; if (p B2 − p A2 + s) < −L, A sells to none of them.
3. Within the fraction (1 − ν − µ) of consumers whose tastes have changed from the first period, a sub-fraction (1 − ν − µ)σ A1 have bought from A in the first period and a sub-
have bought from B in the first period. The first sub-fraction's tastes are uniformly distributed along (0, σ A1 L), while the second sub-fraction's tastes are
All of the first sub-fraction will purchase from B 11 The following presentation is closely adapted from Klemperer (1987b) because of its expositional clarity.
while all of the second sub-fraction will purchase from A,
Adding up demand from the three groups, as derived above, A's total second-period sales are
This equation can be simplified to
B's total second-period sales can be symmetrically derived.
It follows that
In equilibrium,
= 0, which yields (as long as µ + ν = 0):
The equilibrium for B is symmetric, provided that the conditions for equation (22) are satisfied and provided that the first-order conditions specify firms' global best responses. Equations (25)- (27) define the unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium provided that
. 12 The fact that consumers do not know before their first-period purchase whether their tastes for the underlying product characteristics will change or whether they will leave the market guarantees that in the first period all consumers to the left of σ A1 L buy from A, while all those to the right buy from B, for some σ A1 ∈ [0, 1].
Note that the firm with the lower market share charges the higher price. The reason is that on account of exploiting the larger number of variety-seeking brand-switchers from its highershare rival, it is less interested in attracting new customers than its rival, which has to charge a lower price to regain the market share that it is losing on account of variety-seeking effects.
In a symmetric equilibrium, σ A1 = σ B1 = 1 2 , so that we can rewrite equations (25)- (27) as follows.
It is easy to ascertain that total industry profits and the average price paid by consumers are higher in the second period of a market with variety-seeking than in a market without varietyseeking. In a symmetric equilibrium, the profits and prices of both firms are higher than in a market without variety-seeking (by setting ν = 1, µ = 0). In general, it can be shown that the pricing outcomes lie between the collusive (joint profit maximizing) and the competitive (novariety-seeking) outcomes. The higher the degree of variety-seeking in the market, the more sensitive is each firm's profit to market share of the other firm.
Period One
Firm A chooses its first-period price p A1 to maximize its total discounted future profits, as shown in equation (16) < 0. Therefore, both A and B choose higher first-period prices than those that would maximize first-period profits, given the opponent's behavior. Because the opponent's market share is valuable in the future period, each firm prices higher than it would otherwise in order to increase its competitor's market share.
The form of consumer expectations determines how market shares depend on first-period prices. We make two alternative assumptions about consumer expectations: (1) "naïve expectations", in which consumers do not take expected second period prices into account when making their first-period choices, and (2) "rational expectations", in which consumers take expected second period prices into account when making their first-period choices. The results of these analyses are summarized in Table 1 (and the details are provided in the Technical Appendix).
==Insert Table 1 Here==
We find that under both assumptions, the first period of a market with variety-seeking is more collusive than that of a market without variety-seeking. More interestingly, we find that the first period is even more collusive in the rational expectations case than in the naïve expectations case (since y ≥ 1 in Table 1 ). 13 Our interpretation of this finding is that rational (foresighted) consumers recognize that they will be partially locked in to their untried supplier in the second period, and they therefore must predict second-period prices when making their first-period purchase decisions. From equation (25), they know that
> 0, so that a price cut that increases a firm's first-period market share also foretells a second-period price increase by the competing brand (to which a variety-seeking consumer is likely to switch in a search for variety). In this manner, since consumers' rational expectations make them realize that they may be "captive" to the untried product in the second period, they end up being less attracted by a price cut in the first period. This increases the firms' ability to collude in the first period.
Naïve consumers, on the other hand, do not think about the future consequences of their current actions and, therefore, are more price elastic than rational consumers.
In this paper, we study the pricing implications of consumer variety-seeking in a duopoly using a two-period model. We find that prices in both periods are higher than those in an otherwise identical market without variety-seeking. Because firms' second-period profits depend on their competitor's first-period sales, firms price higher in the first period than if they were simply maximizing first-period profits. This provides an explanation for the high prices observed in some markets where consumers seek variety, such as for admission prices for tourist attractions within a tourist city such as Orlando. Our pricing implications differ importantly from those obtained under the inertia model of Klemperer (1987a Klemperer ( , 1987b ) in that our model predicts collusion in both periods, while the inertia model predicts fierce price competition in the first period (which may even undo the benefits of collusion in the second period). Our result obtains regardless of whether consumers are allowed to have naïve or rational expectations about the future. Interestingly, we find that under the rational expectations case, consumers' realization that firms have an incentive to tacitly collude in the second period makes demand less elastic in the first period and ends up sustaining greater collusion in the first period.
There are some interesting directions for future research. First, we assume that varietyseeking behavior is exogenous in our model. However, there is some experimental evidence indicating that consumer variety-seeking behavior can be influenced by marketing variables such as in-store displays (Simonson and Winer 1992) . It will be interesting to investigate optimal pricing strategies of firms if firms' prices influence the consumers' staying costs and/or preferences (for a treatment of endogenous switching costs in the inertia case, see Caminal and Matutes 1990 ). Second, it is possible that the rampant extending of product lines undertaken by manufacturers in various consumer packaged goods categories -such as cereals and cookies -over the past couple of decades may have artificially increased variety-seeking tendencies of consumers in the marketplace. Therefore, it will be useful to jointly endogenize consumers' variety-seeking behavior as well as firms' product line decisions within a theoretical framework in order to investigate normative prescriptions for firms' product line decisions. (
